George's chemicals allocates overhead based on machine hours. selected data for the most recent year follow. estimated manufacturing overhead cost $235,300 actual manufacturing overhead cost $244,800 estimated machine hours 20,000 actual machine hours 22,700 the estimates were made as of the beginning of the year, while the actual results were for the entire year. the predetermined manufacturing overhead rate per machine hour is closest to (round your answer to the nearest cent.)

The following cost and inventory data are taken from the accounting records of mason company for the year just completed: costs incurred: direct labor cost $ 90,000 purchases of raw materials $ 134,000 manufacturing overhead $ 205,000 advertising expense $ 45,000 sales salaries $ 101,000 depreciation, office equipment $ 225,000 beginning of the year end of the year inventories: raw materials $ 8,100 $ 10,300 work in process $ 5,900 $ 21,000 finished goods $ 77,000 $ 25,800 required: 1. prepare a schedule of cost of goods manufactured. 2. prepare the cost of goods sold section of mason company’s income statement for the year.

On april 1, santa fe, inc. paid griffith publishing company $2,448 for 36-month subscriptions to several different magazines. santa fe debited the prepayment to a prepaid subscriptions account, and the subscriptions started immediately. what amount should appear in the prepaid subscription account for santa fe, inc. after adjustments on december 31 of the first year assuming the company is using a calendar-year reporting period and no previous adjustment has been made?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?