Tree row bank wishes to take a position in treasury bond futures contracts, which currently have a quote of 95- 040. tree row thinks interest rates will go up over the period of investment. a. should the bank go long or short on the futures contracts? b. calculate the net profit to tree row bank if the price of the futures contracts decreases to 94- 280. c. calculate the net profit to tree row bank if the price of the futures contracts increases to 95- 210.

Aproduction line has three machines a, b, and c, with reliabilities of .96, .86, and .85, respectively. the machines are arranged so that if one breaks down, the others must shut down. engineers are weighing two alternative designs for increasing the line’s reliability. plan 1 involves adding an identical backup line, and plan 2 involves providing a backup for each machine. in either case, three machines (a, b, and c) would be used with reliabilities equal to the original three. a. compute overall system reliability under plan 1. (round your intermediate calculations and final answer to 4 decimal places.) reliability b. compute overall system reliability under plan 2. (round your intermediate calculations and final answer to 4 decimal places.) reliability c. which plan will provide the higher reliability? plan2plan1

As a result of a thorough physical inventory, waterway company determined that it had inventory worth $320200 at december 31, 2020. this count did not take into consideration the following facts: walker consignment currently has goods worth $47400 on its sales floor that belong to waterway but are being sold on consignment by walker. the selling price of these goods is $75900. waterway purchased $21900 of goods that were shipped on december 27, fob destination, that will be received by waterway on january 3. determine the correct amount of inventory that waterway should report.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?