Attached is the exit, voice, and loyalty game between the state and the citizen. recall that e is the payoff that the citizen gets when she exits, l is the payoff that the state gets from retaining a loyal citizen, 0 is the payoff that the citizen gets from remaining loyal, and c is the cost that the citizen must pay for using voice. let e = 0.25, let l > 1, and let c = 1.0 what is the subgame perfect nash equilibrium or equilibria for the game if you use these payoff values?

Aminor has the legal right to repudiate

10.     lucy is catering an important luncheon and wants to make sure her bisque has the perfect consistency. for her bisque to turn out right, it should have the consistency of a. cold heavy cream. b. warm milk. c. foie gras. d. thick oatmeal. student d   incorrect

The cook corporation has two divisions--east and west. the divisions have the following revenues and expenses: east west sales $ 603,000 $ 506,000 variable costs 231,000 300,000 traceable fixed costs 151,500 192,000 allocated common corporate costs 128,600 156,000 net operating income (loss) $ 91,900 $ (142,000 ) the management of cook is considering the elimination of the west division. if the west division were eliminated, its traceable fixed costs could be avoided. total common corporate costs would be unaffected by this decision. given these data, the elimination of the west division would result in an overall company net operating income (loss)