Denise is a euro-american social worker who is a former welfare client. a divorcee and mother of four, she succeeded in completing her degree and getting off the system in 4 years. she is now working in a welfare-to-work program and sets similar goals for her multicultural clients. denise's attitude and actions indicate that she is operating out of the majority value system and presuming that her clients have the same goals. true or false?

Anita has been named ceo of a popular sports apparel company. as ceo, she is tasked with setting the firm's corporate strategy. which of the following decisions is anita most likely to makea) whether to pursue a differentiation or cost leadership strategy b) which customer segments to target c) how to achieve the highest levels of customer satisfaction d) what range of products the firm should offer

The company is experiencing an increase in competition, and at the same time they are building more production facilities in southeast asia. in this scenario, the top management team is most likely to multiple choice increase the cost of their products. restructure to reflect a more bureaucratic, stable organization. pull decision-making responsibility from low-level management, taking it on themselves. give lower-level managers the authority to make decisions to benefit the firm. rid themselves of all buffering product.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?