He following information relates to current production of outdoor chaise lounges at backyard posh: variable manufacturing costs per unit $ 105 total fixed manufacturing costs $525,000 variable marketing and administrative costs per unit $ 33 total fixed marketing and administrative costs $250,000 the regular selling price per chaise lounge is $ 350. the company is analyzing the opportunity to accept a special sales order for 400 chaise lounges at a price of $ 200 per unit. variable marketing and administrative costs would be $ 15 per unit lower than on regular sales. fixed costs would increase by $ 13 comma 000. the company has the capacity to produce 35 comma 000 chaise lounges per year, but is currently producing and selling 9 comma 000 chaise lounges per year. regular sales will not be affected by the special order. if the company were to accept this special order, how would operating income be affected? a. decrease by $ 30 comma 800 b. decrease by $ 17 comma 800 c. increase by $ 30 comma 800 d. increase by $ 17 comma 800

An increase in the market price of men's haircuts, from $16 per haircut to $26 per haircut, initially causes a local barbershop to have its employees work overtime to increase the number of daily haircuts provided from 20 to 25. when the $26 market price remains unchanged for several weeks and all other things remain equal as well, the barbershop hires additional employees and provides 40 haircuts per day. what is the short-run price elasticity of supply? nothing (your answer should have two decimal places.) what is the long-run price elasticity of supply? nothing (your answer should have two decimal places.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Suppose that fizzo and pop hop are the only two firms that sell orange soda. the following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: pop hopadvertise doesn’t advertisefizzo advertise 10, 10 18, 2doesn’t advertise 2, 18 11, 11for example, the upper right cell shows that if fizzo advertises and pop hop doesn't advertise, fizzo will make a profit of $18 million, and pop hop will make a profit of $2 million. assume this is a simultaneous game and that fizzo and pop hop are both profit-maximizing firms.if fizzo decides to advertise, it will earn a profit if pop hop advertises and a profit if pop hop does not advertise.if fizzo decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit if pop hop advertises and a profit if pop hop does not advertise.if pop hop advertises, fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses (not to advertise, to .if pop hop doesn't advertise, fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses (not to advertise, to . suppose that both firms start off not advertising. if the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? fizzo will choose to advertise and pop hop will choose not to advertise.both firms will choose to advertise.fizzo will choose not to advertise and pop hop will choose to advertise.both firms will choose not to advertise.again, suppose that both firms start off not advertising. if the firms decide to collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? fizzo will choose not to advertise and pop hop will choose to advertise.both firms will choose not to advertise.fizzo will choose to advertise and pop hop will choose not to advertise.both firms will choose to advertise.