Marin county enterprises has a monopoly on the production of lunar-powered homes and has the normal u-shaped average cost curve. at its present profit-maximizing output and price, it is able to earn a positive economic profit. show graphically, the effects in the product market (output, price, profit, and so on) of each of the following changes:

a). lunar-powered homes become a nationwide fad.

b). the cost of labor (a variable factor of production) rises.

David consumes two things: gasoline (g) and bread (b). david's utility function is u(g, b) = 10g^0.25 b^0.75. use the lagrange technique to solve for david's optimal choices of gasoline and bread as a function of the price of gasoline, p_g, the price of bread, p_b, and his income m. with recent decrease in the price of gasoline (maybe due to external shock such as shale gas production) does david increase his consumption of gasoline? for david, how does partial differential g/partial differential p_g depend on his income m? that is, how does david's change in gasoline consumption due to an increase in the price of gasoline depend on his income level? to answer these questions, find the cross-partial derivative, |partial differential^2 g/partial differential m partial differential p_g.

The following items could appear on a bank reconciliation: a. outstanding checks, $670. b. deposits in transit, $1,500. c. nsf check from customer, no. 548, for $175. d. bank collection of note receivable of $800, and interest of $80. e. interest earned on bank balance, $20. f. service charge, $10. g. the business credited cash for $200. the correct amount was $2,000. h. the bank incorrectly decreased the business's by $350 for a check written by another business. classify each item as (1) an addition to the book balance, (2) a subtraction from the book balance, (3) an addition to the bank balance, or (4) a subtraction from the bank balance.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?