Because of complaints about high prices, the island government in 2000 awarded a scallop license to a second fishery, net☼fresh, creating a cournot duopoly. demand conditions in 2000 were the same as in 1999. net☼fresh’s total cost function was tcn = 10qn. both firms sold the same quality product, and both chose daily quantity assuming that their rival’s quantity would be the same as on the previous day.5. write an equation showing how the sea-span’s daily 2000 profit depended on its own output (qs) and that of net☼fresh (qn). s = . using calculus it is possible to show that the sea-span’s cournot reaction function was qs = 60-(0.5)qn. plot and label this function in figure a. put qs on the horizontal axis and qn and the vertical axis.7. explain briefly the economic meaning of this relationship.. write an equation showing how net☼fresh’s daily 2000 profits depended on its own output (qn) and that of sea-span (qs). profit = . net☼fresh’s cournot reaction function was qn = 90 - (0.5)qs. plot and label this function in figure a. 10. what were the cournot equilibrium outputs? qs* = qn* = . briefly explain why this cournot equilibrium is also a nash equilibrium.. what was market price in the cournot equilibrium? p* = . is this price higher, lower, or the same as the monopoly price? . what profit did each firm earn? s* = n* = . in the class lecture on the cournot model, industry profits were shown to be lower in the cournot duopoly equilibrium than in the monopoly equilibrium. here the reverse is true. what accounts for this difference? explain.