You are considering two independent projects. project a has an initial cost of $125,000 and cash inflows of $46,000, $79,000, and $51,000 for years 1 to 3, respectively. project b costs $135,000 with expected cash inflows for years 1 to 3 of $50,000, $30,000, and $100,000, respectively. the required return for both projects is 16 percent. based on irr, you should: a. accept both projects. b. accept project a and reject project b. c. accept project b and reject project a.

Brenda wants a new car that will be dependable transportation and look good. she wants to satisfy both functional and psychological needs. true or false

Fortress international, a large conglomerate, procures a few component parts from external suppliers and also manufactures some of the key raw materials in its own subsidiaries. aside from this, the company does not solely depend on outside distributors to reach its customers. in fact, it has its own retail stores to distribute its products. in this scenario, which of the following alternatives to vertical integration is fortress international applying? a. concentric integration b. taper integration c. horizontal integration d. conglomerate integration

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?