For the economy described below:

c

= 2,600 + 0.8 (y – t) – 10,000r

i p = 2,000 – 10,000r

g = 1,800

nx = 0

t = 3,000

suppose that potential output y* equals 12,000.

a. what real interest rate should the fed set to bring the economy to full employment? you may take as given that the multiplier for this economy is 5.

instruction: enter your response as an integer value.

real rate of interest: %.

b. repeat part a for the case in which potential output y* equals 9,000.

The owner of firewood to go is considering buying a hydraulic wood splitter which sells for $50,000. he figures it will cost an additional $100 per cord to purchase and split wood with this machine, while he can sell each cord of split wood for $125. if, for this machine, design capacity is 50 cords per day, effective capacity is 40 cords per day, and actual output is expected to be 32 cords per day, what would be its efficiency?

Suppose either computers or televisions can be assembled with the following labor inputs: units produced 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 total labor used 3 7 12 18 25 33 42 54 70 90 (a) draw the production possibilities curve for an economy with 54 units of labor. label it p54. (b) what is the opportunity cost of the eighth computer? (c) suppose immigration brings in 36 more workers. redraw the production possibilities curve to reflect this added labor. label the new curve p90.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?