The united states has a dual banking system in the sense that
the public may deposit money in either commercial banks or savings-and-loan associations.
banks offer both demand deposits and time deposits to savers.
banks are chartered by the federal government and by state governments.
banks both take in deposits and make loans.

At the beginning of 2014, winston corporation issued 10% bonds with a face value of $2,000,000. these bonds mature in five years, and interest is paid semiannually on june 30 and december 31. the bonds were sold for $1,852,800 to yield 12%. winston uses a calendar-year reporting period. using the effective-interest method of amortization, what amount of interest expense should be reported for 2014? (round your answer to the nearest dollar.)

On january 8, the end of the first weekly pay period of the year, regis company's payroll register showed that its employees earned $22,760 of office salaries and $70,840 of sales salaries. withholdings from the employees' salaries include fica social security taxes at the rate of 6.20%, fica medicare taxes at the rate of 1.45%, $13,260 of federal income taxes, $1,450 of medical insurance deductions, and $860 of union dues. no employee earned more than $7,000 in this first pay period. required: 1.1 calculate below the amounts for each of these four taxes of regis company. regis’s merit rating reduces its state unemployment tax rate to 3% of the first $7,000 paid to each employee. the federal unemployment tax rate is 0.60

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?