To ensure that as many individuals as possible use seat belts, the government recently decided to subsidize the production of seat belts. Which of the following will happen as a result of this subsidy? Choose one or more: A. The supply curve for seat belts will shift to the right. B. The demand curve for seat belts will increase. C. The demand curve for seat belts will shift to the left. D. The demand curve for seat belts will remain the same. E. The supply curve for seat belts will shift to the left.

On analyzing her company’s goods transport route, simone found that they could reduce transport costs by a quarter if they merged different transport routes. what role (job) does simone play at her company? simone is at her company.

The following accounts are from last year’s books at s manufacturing: raw materials bal 0 (b) 157,400 (a) 172,500 15,100 work in process bal 0 (f) 523,600 (b) 133,700 (c) 171,400 (e) 218,500 0 finished goods bal 0 (g) 477,000 (f) 523,600 46,600 manufacturing overhead (b) 23,700 (e) 218,500 (c) 27,700 (d) 159,400 7,700 cost of goods sold (g) 477,000 s manufacturing uses job-order costing and applies manufacturing overhead to jobs based on direct labor costs. what is the amount of cost of goods manufactured for the year

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?