Procter & Gamble is a consumer products company. It launches many new products every year. The people who develop each new product must understand consumer tastes, distribution, manufacturing, marketing, accounting, and legal issues. P&G uses teams because the group members

Jennifer purchased a house in a brand new development in the outskirts of town. when her house was built, the nearest fire department was nearly 20 miles away. as her neighborhood developed, the density of the community called for a new fire department 1.5 miles away. what effect will the new fire station have on her homeowners insurance premium? a. a new fire department will be more demanding on local taxes. her annual premium will go up. b. the location of a fire department has no bearing on the value of her house. her annual premium will stay the same. c. the new fire department will reduce the risk of financial loss in her home. her annual premium should decrease. d. with a fire department so close (less than 5 miles), financial risk on jennifer’s home practically disappears. she will not need to pay insurance anymore.

Which of the following is correct? a. a tax burden falls more heavily on the side of the market that is more elastic.b. a tax burden falls more heavily on the side of the market that is less elastic.c. a tax burden falls more heavily on the side of the market that is closer to unit elastic.d. a tax burden is distributed independently of the relative elasticities of supply and demand.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?