Laverne and Shirley are moving and are no longer going to be roommates, and they need to divide the dining room furniture set they purchased together.

Using the Method of Sealed Bids, Laverne bids $298 and Shirley bids $161 for the set. Since Laverne's bid is higher, she gets the furniture.

How much will she have to pay Shirley in order to keep the division fair? Round your answer to the nearest dollar.

Post test question number 9 for entering the job market

You wish to retire in 13 years, at which time you want to have accumulated enough money to receive an annual annuity of $23,000 for 18 years after retirement. during the period before retirement you can earn 9 percent annually, while after retirement you can earn 11 percent on your money. what annual contributions to the retirement fund will allow you to receive the $23,000 annuity? use appendix c and appendix d for an approximate answer, but calculate your final answer using the formula and financial calculator methods.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?