G (Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly) Consider a Cournot duopoly model with price function 푝푝(푄푄)= 100−푄푄, where 푄푄=푞푞1+푞푞2 is the total production quantity. Two firms have different unit product costs: 푐푐1= 20 ,푐푐2= 30. a. Write down this game in normal-form representation. b.What is Firm 1’s best response if Firm 2’s quantity is 푞푞2? What is Firm 2’s best response if Firm 1’s quantity is 푞푞1? c. Find the Nash equilibrium.

Answer for the question:

g (Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly) Consider a Cournot duopoly model with price function 푝푝(푄푄)= 100−푄푄, where 푄푄=푞푞1+푞푞2 is the total production quantity. Two firms have different unit product costs: 푐푐1= 20 ,푐푐2= 30. a.Write down this game in normal-form representation.b.What is Firm 1’s best response if Firm 2’s quantity is 푞푞2? What is Firm 2’s best response if Firm 1’s quantity is 푞푞1? c.Find the Nash equilibrium.

is given in the attachment.

Explanation:

answer; ///hong kong;

the answer is "b.the increased supply will create a surplus. "

the essential thought behind price controls is straightforward - utilize the power of law to modify the equilibrium of a market. for instance, the legislature may choose that the steel business needs to survive, and in this way pass a law to set a value floor on steel. this implies all steel sold must offer at or over the floor value, which must be set over the equilibrium cost for it to have any impact. the switch could likewise happen - the administration can choose that steel is excessively costly and set a value roof underneath its equilibrium value, with the goal that all steel must be sold at or beneath that ceiling.