Read and assess the following financial decisions.
Keeping everything else constant, are the following actions good financial decisions or not?

1. Juan is a small-business owner. He has some cash flow and wants to invest in a new project. Juan’s assistant provides an evaluation and estimates the nominal returns that Juan would earn if he invests in the project. Juan reads the evaluation and makes the decision based on the real terms after factoring in inflation.
2. The technology boom in the late 1990s enticed everyone. Wilson is an average investor, and he invested all his money in technology stocks.
3. Mr. and Mrs. Smith are in the middle of their investment planning, so they hire a financial planner. In their discussions with the financial planner, they include their investment timeline and the length of time that they can keep investing. This helps Mr. and Mrs. Smith come up with an investment objective and a financial plan

In 2015, lori assigned a paid-up whole life insurance policy to an irrevocable life insurance trust (ilit) for the benefit of her three children. the ilit contained a crummey provision for the benefit of each child. at the time of the transfer, the whole life insurance policy was valued at $200,000, and since lori had not made any other taxable gifts during her lifetime, she did not owe any gift tax. lori died in 2016, and the face value of the whole life insurance policy of $2,000,000 was paid to the ilit. regarding this transfer, how much is included in lori’s gross estate at her death?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Whom do progressive taxes assess? a. only a large percentage of high-income households b. only a large percentage of organizations c. a large percentage of high-income households and organizations d. a large percentage of low-income households e. a small percentage of high-income households