Which of the following is NOT a strategically beneficial reason why a company may enter into strategic partnerships or cooperative arrangements with key suppliers, distributors, or makers of complementary products?A. To improve access to new marketsB. To expedite the development of promising new technologies or productsC. To enable greater opportunities for employee advancementD. To improve supply chain efficiencyE. To overcome disadvantages of small production volumes that limit scale economies and low production costs

Lambert manufacturing has $100,000 to invest in either project a or project b. the following data are available on these projects (ignore income taxes.): project a project b cost of equipment needed now $100,000 $60,000 working capital investment needed now - $40,000 annual cash operating inflows $40,000 $35,000 salvage value of equipment in 6 years $10,000 - both projects will have a useful life of 6 years and the total cost approach to net present value analysis. at the end of 6 years, the working capital investment will be released for use elsewhere. lambert's required rate of return is 14%. the net present value of project b is:

Afirm wants to hire a project manager (pm) at a salary of $100,000. 30% of pms have high ability, and 70% of pms have low ability. high ability pms generate $120,000 in revenue and low ability pms generate $80,000 in revenue. in addition to differences in productivity, high and low ability pms have different outside offers. if a high ability pm is not hired by the firm, she can work for another company at a salary of $80,000. if the low ability pm is not hired by the firm, she can work for another company for $70,000. high ability pms are also able to get a project management professional (pmp) certification at a cost of $1,000. low ability pms are unable to get a pmp certification (they would fail the test). the firm is not able to observe a pm’s ability, but is able to observe and verify whether or not the pm has a pmp certificate.(a) draw the extensive form of the game.expert answer

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?