Kevin, a recent graduate with a degree in construction management, just landed his first job as a field engineer with a company that provides maintenance and repair for oil and chemical companies. During his first week on the job, his enthusiasm grew after talking to other employees. Although he would be traveling to many job sites during the first five years, many of his new colleagues remarked on the opportunities for growth and promotion and added responsibilities if he persevered with this company. If Herzberg were ranking the job factors that provide satisfaction for this young graduate, he would refer to these asA. Theory X factors.
B. hygiene factors.
C. needs factors.
D. motivators.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?