subject
Business, 07.04.2020 16:57 isaiahst573

This question asks you to work throw the quantitative implications of integration between two different-sized countries in the monopolistic competition model. The market sizes are sus = 100 and SCA = 10. Firms in each country can enter the market by paying a fixed cost 1 and produce with a variable cost 1 for every unit q produced, so TC(q) = 1+ Q. As in lecture, firms in each country face the demand curve Q = S: (1/N - (P-P) where S is the market size, N is the number of firms, P is the price charged by the firm and P is the average price charged by all firms. All firms are identical. Note: don't worry about "fractions" of firms in your answer. We will interpret these quantities as millions (i. e. 2.5 firms equals 2.5 million firms), but just to keep the notation reasonable we'll use the lower numbers. 2 US/Canada Free Trade, Heterogeneous Firms Let's stick with the same example, except now there are two types of firms. One type has marginal cost equal to 1 and one type has marginal cost equal to 1/2. Assume that initially, under autarky, half the firms in each country are of one type and half of the other. All other parameters are the same. 1. For each country, find the price and quantity for each type of firm, given the average price P and the number of firms N. Hint: first find the prices charged by low and high cost firms as a function of the quantities sold by each type of firm using the condition MR = c. Then solve for the quantities that each firm sells (given the average price) by plugging your solution to MR= c into the demand curve. 2. For each country, find the average firm price P charged in each country for a given number of firms N under autarky. Hint: use P = 3. For each country, find the total profits of each type of firm (i. e. including fixed costs) for a given number of firms N under autarky. It's fine not to simplify your answer too much. 4. BONUS: Find the number of firms in each country under autarky, under the assumption that the high-cost firms earn zero profits and that they make up half of all firms). Compute the ratio NUS/NCA Hint: remember the quadratic formula, and pick the lower of the two solutions if they are both positive. Explain why you should pick the lower solution. 5. BONUS: Find the scale and markup of each type of firm in each country under autarky. 6. BONUS: Now assume the countries sign a free trade agreement. In the short run, i. e. no firms exits, compute the new scale and markups for each type of firm. Do they go up or down compared to their autarky values for each country? Does anyone have incentive to exit the market? 7. BONUS Demonstrate whether or not the long run equilibrium (in which firms are allowed to exit if the earn negative total profits but no new firms enter) will feature positive numbers of high cost firms or only low cost firms.

ansver
Answers: 3

Another question on Business

question
Business, 22.06.2019 08:00
In addition to using the icons to adjust page margins, a user can also use
Answers: 1
question
Business, 22.06.2019 20:50
1. which one of the following would be an example of a supply-side market failure? a. a gas station is slowly leaking diesel fuel from its underground tanks, and after the leak is discovered, the business immediately cleans up the pollution at its own expense. b. a gas station is slowly leaking diesel fuel from its underground tanks, but the state uses taxpayer money to clean up the pollution rather than requiring the business to pay. c. your business wants to attract repeat customers by putting on a customer-appreciation picnic at a public park, but you decide not to because you couldn't prevent noncustomers from consuming the food and entertainment you provided. d. everyone rushes to the local retail outlet at midnight on the day of the release of a new video game console, and the store runs out before everyone is able to buy one.
Answers: 1
question
Business, 23.06.2019 00:00
1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?
Answers: 3
question
Business, 23.06.2019 00:00
Which of the following statements is not correct? the stock of publicly owned companies must generally be registered with and reported to a regulatory agency such as the sec. when stock in a closely held corporation is offered to the public for the first time, the transaction is called "going public, or an ipo," and the market for such stock is called the new issue or ipo market. "going public" establishes a firm's true intrinsic value and ensures that a liquid market will always exist for the firm's shares. if you wanted to know what rate of return stocks have provided in the past, you could examine data on the dow jones industrial index, the s& p 500 index, or the nasdaq index.
Answers: 1
You know the right answer?
This question asks you to work throw the quantitative implications of integration between two differ...
Questions
question
Mathematics, 17.07.2019 11:00
question
Mathematics, 17.07.2019 11:00
Questions on the website: 13722360