On February 2, 2016, the Farmer Corporation issued 9,000 shares of no-par stock for $17 per share. Within two hours of the issue, the stock's price jumped on the New York Stock Exchange to $21 per share. Which of the following answers describes the effect of the February 2, 2016 transaction? Assets = Liab. + Com. Stk. Rev. - Exp. = Net Inc Cash A. 153,000 = NA + 153,000 NA - NA = NA 153,000 FA B. 189,000 = NA + 189,000 NA - NA = NA 189,000 IA C. 153,000 = NA + 153,000 NA - NA = NA 153,000 IA D. 189,000 = NA + 189,000 NA - NA = NA 189,000 FA

Amachine purchased three years ago for $720,000 has a current book value using straight-line depreciation of $400,000: its operating expenses are $60,000 per year. a replacement machine would cost $480,000, have a useful life of nine years, and would require $26,000 per year in operating expenses. it has an expected salvage value of $130,000 after nine years. the current disposal value of the old machine is $170,000: if it is kept 9 more years, its residual value would be $20,000. calculate the total costs in keeping the old machine and purchase a new machine. should the old machine be replaced?

Sally has a high-paying management position with a fortune 500 company, but she is tired of working for corporate america. so sally has decided to start a business, and she knows she will be successful as an entrepreneur because entrepreneurs typically

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?