A publisher is printing calendars for the upcoming year. The publisher estimates that demand for the calendars has a mean of 70,000 and a standard deviation of 25,000. The cost per calendar is $3, and the calendars are sold for $10 each. All unsold calendars are recycled at the end of January. a. How many calendars should the publisher have printed? What is the expected profit with the order quantity that you have chosen? What is the product fill rate (i. e., #calendars sold/#calendars demanded by customers) with this quantity? b. The printer has offered to discount the printing cost to $2.75 per calendar if the publisher orders at least 100,000. How many calendars should the publisher have printed?

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

If you were running a company, what are at least two things you could do to improve its productivity.

Why is accountability important in managing safety