Geniue Antique Egyptian Artifacts, Inc. produces three varieties of
antique artifacts for sale to tourists: statuettes, lamps, and urns. All of
the artifacts include special clay. A statuette requires 13 ounces of clay,
a lamp uses 18 ounces, and each urn takes 17 ounces. Existing
capacity of clay is 28,000 ounces per month. A special material is also
used to produce the three artifacts, with each statuette needing 0.8
ounces, each lamp 0.7 ounces, and a typical urn requiring 1.0 ounces.
The company has inventory of 1,200 ounces of special material per
month. The owner of the company wishes to maintain a balanced
marketing program, and has ordered that production of statuettes to be
limited to 275. The overall per unit profit for artifacts is the following:
$199 per statuette, $99 per lamp, and $145 per urn. The owner wants to
know how much of each type of antique to fabricate monthly in order to
optimize profit.
A. What are the objective function, decision variables, and constraints for this optimization problem?B. Solve the linear problem developed in part (a), to determine the optimal production plan.

Many potential buyers value high-quality used cars at the full-information market price of € p1 and lemons at € p2. a limited number of potential sellers value high-quality cars at € v1 ≤ p1 and lemons at € v2 ≤ p2. everyone is risk neutral. the share of lemons among all the used cars that might be potentially sold is € θ . suppose that the buyers incur a transaction cost of $200 to purchase a car. this transaction cost is the value of their time to find a car. what is the equilibrium? is it possible that no cars are sold

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Firms like papa john’s, domino’s, and pizza hut sell pizza and other products that are differentiated in nature. while numerous pizza chains exist in most locations, the differentiated nature of these firms’ products permits them to charge prices above marginal cost. given these observations, is the pizza industry most likely a monopoly, perfectly competitive, monopolistically competitive, or an oligopoly industry?