MVS, Inc. produces cleaning equipment, and operates several divisions. Division A produces a product that it sells to other companies for $25 per unit. It is currently operating at full capacity of 60,000 units per year. Variable manufacturing cost is $13 per unit, and variable marketing cost is $3 per unit.
The company wishes to create a new division, Division B, to produce an innovative new tool that requires the use of Division A's product (or one very similar). Division B will produce 20,000 units. Division B can purchase a product equivalent to Division A's from Company X for $18 per unit. However, MVS, Inc. is considering having Division A supply Division B with the product.
If Division A supplies Division B, the transfer price would be $16 and there would be no marketing costs associated with the units.
Required:
a) From Division A's perspective the net benefit (cost) is .

For example, the upper right cell shows that if expresso advertises and beantown doesn't advertise, expresso will make a profit of $15 million, and beantown will make a profit of $2 million. assume this is a simultaneous game and that expresso and beantown are both profit-maximizing firms. if expresso decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if beantown advertises and a profit of $ million if beantown does not advertise. if expresso decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if beantown advertises and a profit of $ million if beantown does not advertise. if beantown advertises, expresso makes a higher profit if it chooses . if beantown doesn't advertise, expresso makes a higher profit if it chooses . suppose that both firms start off not advertising. if the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? expresso will choose to advertise and beantown will choose not to advertise. expresso will choose not to advertise and beantown will choose to advertise. both firms will choose to advertise. both firms will choose not to advertise.