nformation to help prepare the master budget for the next four months of operations: The budgeted selling price per unit is $125. Budgeted unit sales for April, May, June, and July are 7,600, 10,500, 13,800, and 12,900 units, respectively. All sales are on credit. Regarding credit sales, 20% are collected in the month of the sale and 80% in the following month. The ending finished goods inventory equals 20% of the following month's sales. The ending raw materials inventory equals 30% of the following month’s raw materials production needs. Each unit of finished goods requires 4 pounds of raw materials. The raw materials cost $2.00 per pound. Regarding raw materials purchases, 30% are paid for in the month of purchase and 70% in the following month. The direct labor wage rate is $25.00 per hour. Each unit of finished goods requires 3.0 direct labor-hours. The variable selling and administrative expense per unit sold is $3.40. The fixed selling and administrative expense per month is $80,000. The budgeted sales for May is closest to: Multiple Choice $950,000 $1,612,500 $1,312,500 $1,725,000

In microeconomics, the point at which supply and demand meet is called the blank price

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

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