Yordi Company expects to produce 2 comma 000 units in January that will require 6 comma 000 hours of direct labor and 2 comma 210 units in February that will require 6 comma 630 hours of direct labor. Yordi budgets $ 12 per unit for variable manufacturing overhead; $ 2 comma 000 per month for depreciation; and $ 35 comma 890 per month for other fixed manufacturing overhead costs. Prepare Yordi's manufacturing overhead budget for January and February, including the predetermined overhead allocation rate using direct labor hours as the allocation base. (Abbreviations used: VOH = variable manufacturing overhead; FOH = fixed manufacturing overhead.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?