Assume that task J has a most likely duration of 20 days, an optimistic duration of 13 days, and a pessimistic duration of 30 days. If the optimistic and pessimistic durations are 95 percent estimates, the standard deviation for task J is days. a) 5.167b) 5c) 4.67d) 3.2

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

When used-car dealers signal the quality of a used car with a warranty, a. buyers believe the signal because the cost of a false signal is high b. it is not rational to believe the signal because some used-car dealers are crooked c. the demand for lemons is eliminated d. the price of a lemon rises above the price of a good used car because warranty costs on lemons are greater than warranty costs on good used cars

You hear your supervisor tell another supervisor that a fire drill will take place later today when the fire alarm sounds that afternoon you should