A mixed-strategy equilibrium is one in which each player assigns a probability distribution over the possible pure strategies. In this particular game, this means that each person will play Morning with a certain probability and Afternoon with 1 minus that probability. To solve for the mixed-strategy equilibria, you must first determine each person's best response, given the strategy of the other player. Let λλ be the probability that Yakov plays Morning, and rhorho be the probability that Rajiv plays Morning. Based on the payoff matrix, you know that each player's goal is to arrive on move-in day at different times. Let λ be the probability that Larry plays Morning, and p be the probability that Kevin plays Morning. Based on the previous payoff matrix, you know that each player's goal is to arrive on move-in day at different times. Complete the following table with Kevin's best response When Larry plays λ= 1 and λ=0. Larry's Strategy λ=1 λ=0Kevin's Best response