Jamesway Corporation has two separate divisions that operate as profit centers. The following information is available for the most recent year: White divisionGrey division Sales (net)$270,000 $540,000 Salary expense37,800 64,800 Cost of goods sold135,000 202,500 The White Division occupies 25,000 square feet in the plant. The Grey Division occupies 25,000 square feet. Rent is an indirect expense and is allocated based on square footage. Rent expense for the year was $50,000. Gross profit for the White and Grey Divisions is: WhiteGrey A.$97,200 $272,700 B.$232,200 $475,200 C.$135,000 $337,500 D.$72,200 $247,700 E.$97,200 $247,700

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?