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Business, 12.08.2020 06:01 whitty

According to the Security Risk Management: Building an Information Security Risk Management Program From the Ground Up textbook, "there will be risks that can't be mitigated at all, aren't worth the effort to reduce the exposure any further, or just won't be addressed in the short term due to other priorities" (p. 47). Provide a real-world example for each of these three scenarios and explain why the risk meets the criteria.

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