Marc and michelle are married and earned salaries this year of $69,200 and $13,950, respectively. in addition to their salaries, they received interest of $350 from municipal bonds and $1,150 from corporate bonds. marc and michelle also paid $3,150 of qualifying moving expenses, and marc paid alimony to a prior spouse in the amount of $2,150. marc and michelle have a 10-year-old son, matthew, who lived with them throughout the entire year. thus, marc and michelle are allowed to claim a $1,000 child tax credit for matthew. marc and michelle paid $7,300 of expenditures that qualify as itemized deductions and they had a total of $6,330 in federal income taxes withheld from their paychecks during the course of the year. (use the tax rate schedules. )

Joe finally found a house for sale that he liked. which factor could increase the price of the house he likes? a. both he and the seller each have a real estate agent. b. a home inspector finds faulty wiring in the house. c. the house has been for sale for almost a year. d. several buyers all want that same house.

You want to have $80,000 in your savings account 11 years from now, and you’re prepared to make equal annual deposits into the account at the end of each year. if the account pays 6.30 percent interest, what amount must you deposit each year? (do not round intermediate calculations and round your answer to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?