Suppose you make the decision to volunteer for an event in school for an hour this week. This means that you would have to take an hour off from your summer job, for which you earn $10 per hour. You spend $3 in bus fare in order to get to school and $5 for lunch. If you went to work, you would have been able to walk to your job, and lunch would have been provided to you by the office. The opportunity cost of volunteering is:

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

En major recording acts are able to play at the stadium. if the average profit margin for a concert is $175,000, how much would the stadium clear for all of these events combined?

Experienced problem solvers always consider both the value and units of their answer to a problem. why?