Bored, I don't have anything to do, Just chilling

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

The systems analysis phase includes three activities – requirements modeling, data and process modeling, and consideration of development strategies. choose two of these activities, explain their differences, and discuss how they are used to accomplish the main objective which is to understand the proposed project.

Abond is issued for less than its face value. which statement most likely would explain why? a. the bond's contract rate is higher than the market rate at the time of the issue. b. the bond's contract rate is the same as the market rate at the time of the issue. c. the bond's contract rate is lower than the market rate at the time of the issue. d. the bond isn't secured by specific assets of the corporation.