Zara collects massive amounts of data on its SKUs, orders, sales patterns, store inventories, and other variables. This information is stored in a(n)

Ineed : ): will mark brainliest! describe sinek's golden circle. what does he use this for? sinek argues that "people don't buy 'what' you do; people buy 'why' you do it." what does he mean by this? do you agree or disagree with him? why? what are the advantages of hiring people who share the same beliefs and visions in terms of the company's 'why' or purpose? why wasn't tivo successful as a company? what is the difference between leaders and those who lead? how does safety contribute to trust and cooperation? what are some ways that leaders can make the company environment safe? what are the advantages of companies where employees feel safe and protected?

Pam is a low-risk careful driver and fran is a high-risk aggressive driver. to reveal their driver types, an auto-insurance company a. refuses to insure high-risk drivers b. charges a higher premium to owners of newer cars than to owners of older cars c. offers policies that enable drivers to reveal their private information d. uses a pooling equilibrium e. requires drivers to categorize themselves as high-risk or low-risk on the application form

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?