Riddle that will make you smarter! Will give Brailest to first correct answer! First think of the person who lives in disguise,
Who deals in secrets and tells naught but lies.
Next, tell me what’s always the last thing to mend,
The middle of middle and end of the end?
And finally give me the sound often heard
During the search for a hard-to-find word.
Now string them together, and answer me this,
Which creature would you be unwilling to kiss?

Precision dyes is analyzing two machines to determine which one it should purchase. the company requires a rate of return of 15 percent and uses straight-line depreciation to a zero book value over the life of its equipment. ignore bonus depreciation. machine a has a cost of $462,000, annual aftertax cash outflows of $46,200, and a four-year life. machine b costs $898,000, has annual aftertax cash outflows of $16,500, and has a seven-year life. whichever machine is purchased will be replaced at the end of its useful life. which machine should the company purchase and how much less is that machine's eac as compared to the other machine's

Russell's study compared gpa of those students who volunteered for academic study skills training and those who did not elect to take the training. he found that those who had the training also had higher gpa. with which validity threat should russell be most concerned?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?