Blue Company acquired a manufacturing facility on four acres of land for a lump-sum price of $8,400,000. The building included used but functional equipment. Blue Company intended to use the manufacturing facility in its future operatioins. According to independent appraisals, the fair values were $3,480,000, $3,480,000, and $4,640,000 for the building, land, and equipment, respectively. The initial values of the building, land, and equipment would be: Building Land Equipment a.$3,480,000 $3,480,000 $4,640,000 b.$3,480,000 $3,480,000 $580,000 c.$2,520,000 $2,520,000 $3,360,000 d. None of these answer choices are correct. Multiple Choice Option C Option B Option A Option D

Employees of dti, inc. worked 1,600 direct labor hours in january and 1,000 direct labor hours in february. dti expects to use 18,000 direct labor hours during the year, and expects to incur $22,500 of worker’s compensation insurance cost for the year. the cash payment for this cost will be paid in april. how much insurance premium should be allocated to products made in january and february?

Consider an economy where government expenditures are 10 and total tax revenues are 10. the supply of labor is fixed at 125 and the supply of capital is fixed at 8. the economy is described by the following equations. y k to the power of 1 divided by 3 end exponent l to the power of 2 divided by 3 end exponent c 2.5 + 0.75 ( y - t ) i 10 - 0.5 r the level of private savings is

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?