I want a 15 + boy from Oklahoma.

The price of trade suppose that portugal and sweden both produce rye and wine. portugal's opportunity cost of producing a bottle of wine is 4 bushels of rye while sweden's opportunity cost of producing a bottle of wine is 10 bushels of rye. by comparing the opportunity cost of producing wine in the two countries, you can tell thatportugal/sweden has a comparative advantage in the production of wine.andportugal/sweden has a comparative advantage in the production of rye. suppose that portugal and sweden consider trading wine and rye with each other. portugal can gain from specialization and trade as long as it receives more rye for each bottle of wine it exports to sweden. similarly, sweden can gain from trade as long as it receives more bottles of wine for each bushel of rye it exports to portugal. based on your answer to the last question, which of the following prices of trade (that is, price of wine in terms of rye) would allow both sweden and portugal to gain from trade? a. 1 bushels of rye per bottle of wineb. 8 bushels of rye per bottle of winec. 9 bushels of rye per bottle of wined. 3 bushels of rye per bottle of wine

There is a small, family-owned store that sells food and household goods in a small town. the owners have good relations with the community, especially with local farmers who supply much of the food. the farmers aren't organized into a cooperative or union, and the store deals with each individually. suppose the store wanted to buy some farms to control the supply of certain vegetables. how would you classify this strategic move? select one: a. horizontal integration b. forward integration c. backward integration d. concentric integration

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?