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Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

What is the sequence of events that could lead to trade surplus

Bandar industries berhad of malaysia manufactures sporting equipment. one of the company’s products, a football helmet for the north american market, requires a special plastic. during the quarter ending june 30, the company manufactured 35,000 helmets, using 22,500 kilograms of plastic. the plastic cost the company $171,000. according to the standard cost card, each helmet should require 0.6 kilograms of plastic, at a cost of $8 per kilogram. 1. what is the standard quantity of kilograms of plastic (sq) that is allowed to make 35,000 helmets? 2. what is the standard materials cost allowed (sq x sp) to make 35,000 helmets? 3. what is the materials spending variance? 4. what is the materials price variance and the materials quantity variance?