Megan and Susan are roommates. They spend most of their time studying (of course), but they leave some time for their favorite activities: making pizza and brewing root beer. Megan takes 5 hours to brew a gallon of root beer and 3 hours to make a pizza. Susan takes 8 hours to brew a gallon of root beer and 4 hours to make a pizza. Megan's opportunity cost of making a pizza is of root beer, and Susan's opportunity cost of making a pizza is of root beer. has an absolute advantage in making pizza, and has a comparative advantage in making pizza. If Megan and Susan trade foods with each other, will trade away pizza in exchange for root beer. The price of pizza can be expressed in terms of gallons of root beer. The highest price at which pizza can be traded that would make both roommates better off is of root beer, and the lowest price that makes both roommates better off is of root beer per pizza.

Which of the following actions is most likely to result in a decrease in the money supply? a. the discount rate on overnight loans is lowered. b. the government sells a new batch of treasury bonds. c. the federal reserve bank buys treasury bonds. d. the required reserve ratio for banks is decreased. 2b2t

Florence invested in a factory requiring. federally-mandated reductions in carbon emissions. how will this impact florence as the factory's owner? a. her factory will be worth less once the upgrades are complete. b. her factory will likely be bought by the epa. c. florence will have to invest a large amount of capital to update the factory for little financial gain. d. florence will have to invest a large amount of capital to update the factory for a large financial gain.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?