Consider the issue of determining the optimal amount of investment in national defense in a country composed of two regions. Assume that national defense is a pure public good; it is non-rival and non-excludable. Denote by q the amount of national defense. The total cost of producing q units of defense is C(q) = 109. In region 1, the total benefit of national defense is: B1(q) = 10q -1/2q^2

In region 2, the total benefit of national defense is

B2(q) = 20q - q^2

Suppose the national government knows the socially optimal amount of defense, and proposes to fund it by requiring each region to pay half of the total cost.

1. Calculate the change in welfare for each region under this policy compared to the scenario where region 1 has to finance all the investment in national defense.
2. If the two regions could vote on whether to adopt this policy instead of having region 1 finance all defense investment, would both regions vote yes?