(a) Tracy Company sells three different types of home heating stoves (gas, wood, and pellet) .
The cost and net realizable value of its inventory of stoves are as follows.
Cost
Net Realizable Value
Gas
NT$ 84,000
NT$ 79,000
Wood
250,000
280,000
Pellet
112,000
101,000
Determine the value of the company's inventory under the lower-of-cost-or-net realizable
value approach. .​

Mikkelson corporation's stock had a required return of 12.50% last year, when the risk-free rate was 3% and the market risk premium was 4.75%. then an increase in investor risk aversion caused the market risk premium to rise by 2%. the risk-free rate and the firm's beta remain unchanged. what is the company's new required rate of return? (hint: first calculate the beta, then find the required return.) do not round your intermediate calculations.

At present, the united states has an embargo against north korea because a. the two countries have extremely poor political relations. b. north korea will not adopt a capitalist government. c. north korean products are too difficult to use. d. north korea has an embargo on american products. e. products from north korea are in higher demand than american-made products.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?