On December 31, Jarden Co.'s Allowance for Doubtful Accounts has an unadjusted credit balance of $14,000. Jarden prepares a schedule of its December 31 accounts receivable by age. Accounts Receivable Age of Accounts Receivable Expected Percent Uncollectible $ 880,000 Not yet due 1.20 % 352,000 1 to 30 days past due 1.95 70,400 31 to 60 days past due 6.45 35,200 61 to 90 days past due 32.50 14,080 Over 90 days past due 67.00 2. Prepare the adjusting entry to record bad debts expense at December 31. (Round

Oliver is the vice president of production at his company and has been managing the launch of new software systems. he worked with a team of individuals who were tasked to create awareness about a specific product and also to approach potential purchasers of the product. which department managers were part of oliver’s team?

Schuepfer inc. bases its selling and administrative expense budget on budgeted unit sales. the sales budget shows 1,800 units are planned to be sold in march. the variable selling and administrative expense is $4.30 per unit. the budgeted fixed selling and administrative expense is $35,620 per month, which includes depreciation of $2,700 per month. the remainder of the fixed selling and administrative expense represents current cash flows. the cash disbursements for selling and administrative expenses on the march selling and administrative expense budget should be:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?