Walmart, Grocery, Target Top Personal Care Market Share A Personal Care Study conducted by TABS Analytics shows that Walmart has a 19.4 percent share of the $40 billion personal care market, while grocery stores Kroger and Public each have a 16.6 percent share, and Target, 12.8 percent. Source: drugstorenews, March 23, 2017 (a.) The four-firm concentration ratio is percent. Answer to 1 decimal place.

The market demand curve for a popular teen magazine is given by q = 80 - 10p where p is the magazine price in dollars per issue and q is the weekly magazine circulation in units of 10,000. if the circulation is 400,000 per week at the current price, what is the consumer surplus for a teen reader with maximum willingness to pay of $3 per issue?

Johnson company uses the allowance method to account for uncollectible accounts receivable. bad debt expense is established as a percentage of credit sales. for 2018, net credit sales totaled $6,400,000, and the estimated bad debt percentage is 1.40%. the allowance for uncollectible accounts had a credit balance of $61,000 at the beginning of 2018 and $49,500, after adjusting entries, at the end of 2018.required: 1. what is bad debt expense for 2018 as a percent of net credit sales? 2. assume johnson makes no other adjustment of bad debt expense during 2018. determine the amount of accounts receivable written off during 2018.3. if the company uses the direct write-off method, what would bad debt expense be for 2018?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?