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Accublade castings inc. casts blades for turbine engines. within the casting department, alloy is first melted in a crucible, then poured into molds to produce the castings. on may 1, there were 230 pounds of alloy in process, which were 60% complete as to conversion. the work in process balance for these 230 pounds was $32,844, determined as follows: exercises during may, the casting department was charged $350,000 for 2,500 pounds of alloy and $19,840 for direct labor. factory overhead is applied to the department at a rate of 150% of direct labor. the department transferred out 2,530 pounds of finished castings to the machining department. the may 31 inventory in process was 44% complete as to conversion. prepare the following may journal entries for the casting department: the materials charged to production the conversion costs charged to production the completed production transferred to the machining department determine the work in process"casting department may 31 balance.

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

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