Kirk McCoy is district sales manager for the Jimmy Dean division Lee Corp. He has six sales managers that report to him. McCoy

most of the decisions for his people and demands that they check

him on any changes in pricing, sales scheduling and routing, and

presentation material. McCoy operates a department.

You are working on a bid to build two city parks a year for the next three years. this project requires the purchase of $249,000 of equipment that will be depreciated using straight-line depreciation to a zero book value over the three-year project life. ignore bonus depreciation. the equipment can be sold at the end of the project for $115,000. you will also need $18.000 in net working capital for the duration of the project. the fixed costs will be $37000 a year and the variable costs will be $148,000 per park. your required rate of return is 14 percent and your tax rate is 21 percent. what is the minimal amount you should bid per park? (round your answer to the nearest $100) (a) $214,300 (b) $214,100 (c) $212,500 (d) $208,200 (e) $208,400

Anita has been named ceo of a popular sports apparel company. as ceo, she is tasked with setting the firm's corporate strategy. which of the following decisions is anita most likely to makea) whether to pursue a differentiation or cost leadership strategy b) which customer segments to target c) how to achieve the highest levels of customer satisfaction d) what range of products the firm should offer

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?