Goodstone Tire Corporation sells tires for $100 each. Per unit costs associated with producing and selling the tires are: Direct materials and labor $45; Factory overhead $20; Selling and administrative $15. The variable portion of the factory overhead is $8 per unit. A foreign company wants to purchase 10,000 tires for $70 each. The order would not require any selling or administrative costs. The purchaser will pay the shipping costs, but Goodstone will have to pay a $100,000 inspection fee in order to be able to make the foreign sale. Accepting the special order will not affect current sales or production. What effect would accepting the special order have on Goodstone's net operating income

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?