since yall question my group ch'at heres sum stuff we say when I said zania gon get all the boys I meant the one with the dress it was hard to find but it was the black and white picture

Case in point 2.4 attaway airlines, part two back at attaway airlines, the morning meeting ended with no agreement between dan esposito and molly kinnon. in fact, a new issue arose. molly now says that the new accounting system is entitled to the highest priority because the federal government soon will require the reporting of certain types of company-paid health insurance premiums. because the current system will not handle this report, she insists that the entire accounting system is a nondiscretionary project. as you might expect, dan is upset. can part of a project be nondiscretionary? what issues need to be discussed? the committee meets again tomorrow, and the members will look to you, as the it director, for guidance.

Which is the most compelling reason why mobile advertising is related to big data?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?