Hache Corporation uses the weighted-average method in its process costing system. The first processing department, the Welding Department, started the month with 17,150 units in its beginning work in process inventory that were 20% complete with respect to conversion costs. The conversion cost in this beginning work in process inventory was $7,600. An additional 89,300 units were started into production during the month and 92,300 units were completed in the Welding Department and transferred to the next processing department. There were 14,150 units in the ending work in process inventory of the Welding Department that were 90% complete with respect to conversion costs. A total of $202,700 in conversion costs were incurred in the department during the month. The cost per equivalent unit for conversion costs for the month is closest to:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?