Sergio leaves his job as a hockey coach to open his own skate sharpening shop at a local rink. Sergio is confident that the skate sharpening business will earn him more than the $500 per week that he earned at his coaching position. Sergio's business is good; he averages 100 pairs of skates per week, and charges $8 per pair to sharpen skates. He does all of the work himself, but has to pay the rink $150 per week for the lease on the equipment. Is Sergio better off operating his own business? a. No, he is only earning $150 per week.
b. Yes, he is earning an economic profit of $800 each week.
c. Yes, he is now earning an economic profit of $150 per week.
d. No, he should have stayed at the coaching position where he earned $500 per week.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?