Business, 24.09.2021 02:10 batmanmarie2004

Please help me solve this exercise

Answers: 2

Show answers

Another question on Business

Business, 22.06.2019 01:50

Which value describes the desire to be one’s own boss? a. autonomy b. status c. security d. entrepreneurship

Answers: 2

Answer

Business, 22.06.2019 07:10

1. the healthy pantry bought new shelving and financed $7,300 with 36 monthly payments of $267.65 each. suppose the firm pays the loan off with 13 payments left. use the rule of 78 to find the amount of unearned interest. 2. the healthy pantry bought new shelving and financed $7,300 with 36 monthly payments of $267.65 each. suppose the firm pays the loan off with 13 payments left. use the rule of 78 to find the amount necessary to pay off the loan. ! i entered 967.82 for question 1 and 5,455.78 for question 2 and it said it was

Answers: 3

Answer

Business, 22.06.2019 19:10

You have just been hired as a brand manager at kelsey-white, an american multinational consumer goods company. recently the firm invested in the development of k-w vision, a series of systems and processes that allow the use of up-to-date data and advanced analytics to drive informed decision making about k-w brands. it is 2018. the system is populated with 3 years of historical data. as brand manager for k-w’s blue laundry detergent, you are tasked to lead the brand's turnaround. use the vision platform to to develop your strategy and grow blue’s market share over the next 4 years.

Answers: 2

Answer

Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Answers: 3

Answer

You know the right answer?

Please help me solve this exercise
...

Questions