The sum of the explicit and implicit costs incurred in the production process is called

Consider how health insurance affects the quantity of health care services performed. suppose that the typical medical procedure has a cost of $160, yet a person with health insurance pays only $40 out of pocket. her insurance company pays the remaining $120. (the insurance company recoups the $120 through premiums, but the premium a person pays does not depend on how many procedures that person chooses to undergo.) consider the following demand curve in the market for medical care. use the black point (plus symbol) to indicate the quantity of procedures demanded if each procedure has a price of $160. then use the grey point (star symbol) to indicate the quantity of procedures demanded if each procedure has a price of $40. q d at p=$160 q d at p=$40 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 price of medical procedures quantity of medical procedures demand if the cost of each procedure to society is truly $160, the quantity that maximizes total surplus is procedures. economists often blame the health insurance system for excessive use of medical care. given your analysis, the use of care might be viewed as excessive because consumers get procedures whose value is than the cost of producing them.

The largest elements of community corrections are

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?