Assume that a company has a control deficiency regarding the processing of cash receipts. Reconciliation of cash accounts by a competent individual otherwise independent of the cash function might make the likelihood of a significant misstatement due to the control deficiency remote. In this situation, reconciliation may be referred to as what type of control

Grey company holds an overdue note receivable of $800,000 plus recorded accrued interest of $64,000. the effective interest rate is 8%. as the result of a court-imposed settlement on december 31, year 3, grey agreed to the following restructuring arrangement: reduced the principal obligation to $600,000.forgave the $64,000 accrued interest.extended the maturity date to december 31, year 5.annual interest of $40,000 is to be paid to grey on december 31, year 4 and year 5. the present value of the interest and principal payments to be received by grey company discounted for two years at 8% is $585,734. grey does not elect the fair value option for reporting the debt modification. on december 31, year 3, grey would recognize a valuation allowance for impaired loans of

Mystic bottling company bottles popular beverages in the bottling department. the beverages are produced by blending concentrate with water and sugar. the concentrate is purchased from a concentrate producer. the concentrate producer sets higher prices for the more popular concentrate flavors. a simplified bottling department cost of production report separating the cost of bottling the four flavors follows:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?